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Newspaper critics‟ movie reviews are often used by potential movie viewers as signals of expert 
quality assessment. In this paper, we assess if there is any racial bias in these critics‟ reviews, 
and if so, what impact these biases have on viewer demand.  To do this, we develop a dataset that 
tracks ratings from 68 popular movie critics for 566 movies released in the U.S. between 2003 
and 2007.  The data also include measures of movie production costs, marketing expenditures, 
type of movie (i.e. genre, MPAA rating, etc.), actor and director quality measures, audience 
tastes and critics‟ gender, experience and race.  Despite inclusion of all these controls for movie 
quality and other drivers of critic ratings, we find that ratings for movies with a black lead actor 
and all white supporting cast are approximately 6% lower than for other racial compositions.  
These results appear consistent with implicit discrimination.  Using estimates of the impact of 
critics‟ ratings on movie revenues, we find that lower critic ratings for black lead-white support 
movies translate into lost revenues of up to 4% or about $2.57 million on average.  In sum, 
prejudice concerning race roles (e.g., the race of the leader versus supporters/followers) can have 
a direct impact on critic quality assessment, and thereby alter market outcomes. 
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Many products and services are experience goods, where consumers cannot fully observe 
quality before making a purchase.  In such markets, consumers can utilize the insights of experts 
to assess quality before purchasing the product.  Examples of experience goods markets with 
experts include automobiles, restaurants, financial stocks, books, and movies. Expert opinions 
can  influence  consumer  demand  in  these  experience  goods  markets,  so  it  is  important  to 
understand whether there exists any inherent bias in their assessments.  In this paper, we test for 
a particular form of bias in expert opinion - racial bias - of the quality of movies when they are 
released in theaters. The U.S. motion picture industry is large (revenues of nearly $10 billion in 
the United States in 2008), and one where critics‟ reviews constitute expert opinion, and are 
widely disseminated and read. 
There  is  evidence  that  racial  discrimination  exists  in  various  economically  pertinent 
situations.  Examples include differences in wages (Chandra 2000), prices paid in consumer 
markets  (Ayres  and  Siegelman  1995;  Yinger  1998),  credit  availability  (Blanchflower  et  al. 
2003), judicial sentencing (Abrams et al. 2006) and even in sports (Price and Wolfers 2007).  To 
our knowledge, this is the first study to test for racial bias in expert quality assessment, where 
consumers make their choices subsequent to, and conditional on, this assessment. 
That said, there are at least two reasons why  critical movie reviewing  is an unlikely 
context for racial discrimination. First, movie critics are employed by the news industry with a 
documented liberal bent (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006).  Second, critics‟ ratings are read and 
assessed by a very broad audience, including other critics and movie studios, who can potentially 
detect bias.  However, certain types of discrimination may be more subtle than simply penalizing 
a movie for having a black
1 lead or all-black cast, and so can be harder to detect anecdotally.  
Further, discrimination may not even occur at a conscious level (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2005).  
Consequently, racial bias can be hard to detect not just for readers of the newspaper (who might 
not follow reviews for all movies), but even for studios or watchdog groups who might be more 
vigilant in their reading of critic reviews
2.   
                                                 
1 We use the term black instead of African-American throughout simply because not all black actors in our sample 
are American.  Also, for simplicity, we refer to both actors and actresses as actors. 
2 Studios devote considerable resources to the management of the review process.  Therefore one would expect that 
studios would quickly detect overt racism in the review process.  Examples of studio management of the review 2 
 
In determining whether critic reviews are racially biased, an important factor to consider 
is whether they are influenced by racism in casting patterns in Hollywood.  The U.S. movie 
industry has a history suggestive of racial discrimination in casting. For several decades the 
majority of blacks cast in movies were seen in subservient or stereotypical roles.  Only in the last 
decade have black actors made some progress in the variety of roles available, and in recognition 
of their performance via awards.  For example, in its eighty years of existence, the Academy 
Awards have only awarded 11 Oscars to blacks, six of which were awarded between 2002 and 
2009  (Khatami  2009).    Robinson  (2006)  documents  that  Hollywood  studios  often  specify  a 
preferred race for particular roles and overwhelmingly favor white male actors for leading roles, 
leaving only a small proportion of roles open to blacks, and even fewer roles that are “cross-
over” roles, or roles that can be played by an actor of any race.  Racial stereotypes often apply to 
Latino actors as well; Latinos are almost always portrayed as expendable characters or as “foils 
for largely white characters” who define the movie (Powalski 2009).  It is useful to see whether 
historical stereotypes affect (viewer and) critic rankings of movies where these stereotypes are 
violated or reinforced.
3 
To conduct our analysis of whether newspaper critics  exhibit racial biased, we obtain 
newspaper critics‟ reviews for 566 movies released between 2003 and 2007.  We focus on 68 
critics  from  a  set  of  critics  referred  to  as  “cream-of-the-crop”  in  movie  industry  parlance 
(metacritic.com; rottentomatoes.com), because they are employed by some of the most illustrious 
newspapers in the U.S. Our main explanatory variable is the racial composition of the cast.  In 
addition, to control for whether critics are tailoring their reviews to their audience preferences, 
we select those who publish in newspapers for which we can observe readership characteristics.  
We also collect an extensive set of controls, including the type of movie (genre, MPAA rating), 
production cost, advertising expenditure, quality of the actors, the race of the director, critical 
acclaim  awards  and  nominations  for  the  actors,  director,  and  movie,  demographics  of  the 
newspaper audience and time controls.  These controls are important in our analysis since some 
                                                                                                                                                             
process include studios excerpting positive reviews in movie advertising, and sometimes delaying or foregoing 
advance  screenings  if  they  anticipate  bad  reviews.  An  extreme  example  was  when  Sony  Corporation  invented 
fictitious  film  critic  David  Manning,  who  consistently  gave  good  reviews  to  Sony  movies.  Further,  studios 
sometimes invite and host critics at lavish movie premieres, presumably in an attempt to coerce good reviews.  
3 Dovidio et al. (1997) show that when confronted with evidence that does not fit racial stereotypes (e.g. observing a 
black Secretary of state or a black President or a black CEO of a Fortune 500 company), whites construct subtypes 
(e.g. black professionals) to fit the new evidence rather than alter their basic stereotyping schema.   3 
 
of  the  movie  characteristics  that  comprise  quality  may  also  be  correlated  with  the  racial 
composition of the cast.  Additionally, we include controls for reviewer experience, gender, and 
race.  Finally, we obtain data on movie box office revenues, allowing us to measure the impact of 
critics‟ reviews on them.  Using our estimates, we can attempt to determine the cost of critics‟ 
bias to movies‟ theatrical revenues due to lower ratings.   
We find that movies with black leads and all-white supporting casts (Bw henceforth) 
receive  lower  critic  ratings  –  more  than  6%  lower  –  compared  to  movies  with  other  racial 
compositions.  This finding suggests a bias by critics not against black actors or even black lead 
actors per se, but instead a bias against movies with black leads and white support.  Notably, 
these movies are the ones that break the trend of blacks playing subservient or subordinate (to 
whites) characters. In contrast, we find director (whose role is not as visible as an actor‟s) race 
has no impact on critics‟ ratings. 
Using estimates from our movie box office revenues regressions, we establish an upper 
bound on the impact that critic reviews can have on viewer choices (through total revenues) for 
the movies in our sample.  We find that a movie with a black lead and all-white support suffers 
up to a 4% loss in box office revenues due to lower ratings, compared to a movie with an all-
white cast.  The average revenue for movies in our sample is $64.2 million, and therefore the 4% 
loss  in  box  office  is  on  average  about  $2.57  million.  The  measured  loss  is  similar  when 
comparing to all-black casts (henceforth Bb) and casts with white leads and at least one black 
support  (henceforth  Wb).  Since  theatrical  revenues often correlate with sales in  subsequent 
distribution channels like DVD, pay-per-view etc., the total revenue loss across these various 
outlets might be even larger.    
This  paper  primarily  contributes  to  two  streams  of  literature.    First,  it  adds  to  the 
literature on impartiality of expert judgments. Extant literature highlights  the role of critical 
reviews in determining market outcomes for several experience goods: financial stocks (Goh & 
Ederington  1993),  sports  betting  (Avery  &  Chevalier  1999),  movies  (Eliashberg  &  Shugan 
1997), etc.  In the movie industry, newspaper critics are perceived to be unaffiliated with studio 
producers and therefore  perceived  as  impartial.  Research  shows  that  more than one third of 
consumers indicate that they actively seek out critics‟ reviews, and about one third of filmgoers 
attest to choosing movies on the basis of positive reviews (Eliashberg & Shugan 1997).   Given 4 
 
the importance of positive critical reviews for movies, our finding of a systematic bias in these 
reviews is of particular relevance. 
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on discrimination.  Following this literature 
(e.g., Arrow 1998 and Bertrand et al. 2005), there are three types of discrimination: statistical 
discrimination, taste-based discrimination, and implicit discrimination.  Statistical discrimination 
is based on the evaluator‟s inability to perfectly observe quality of the candidate, and therefore 
the  evaluator  resorts  to  statistical  differences  in  ability  of  races  as  a  measure  of  any  one 
candidate‟s  ability.    Taste-based  discrimination  relies  directly  on  racial  prejudice  of  the 
evaluator.    Both  statistical  and  taste-based  discrimination  are  based  on  conscious  thought 
processes of the evaluator.  In implicit discrimination, agents non-consciously discriminate on 
the basis of existing stereotypes.  As we discuss further below, our results are consistent with 
implicit  discrimination  on  the  part  of  newspaper  critics,  and  we  provide  two  psychological 
mechanisms for non-conscious or implicit discrimination.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss various theories 
behind critics‟ influence and mechanisms for racial discrimination.  We discuss data in section 3.  
In section 4, we present our empirical results and provide discussion of their implications.  We 
offer conclusions in section 5.   
 
2. Determinants and Impact of Critical Reviews 
In this section, we discuss how critics‟ reviews influence demand.  We then discuss key 
factors  that  can  influence  critical  reviews,  including  the  mechanisms  through  which  racial 
discrimination may play a role.   
There  are two broad routes through which critic reviews  might  correlate with  movie 
demand: the influencer role and the predictor role.  As influencers, critics act as opinion leaders 
who steer consumers‟ movie selection decisions, especially in the early weeks of a movie‟s 
release  when  alternative  sources  of  movie  information  (e.g.  word-of-mouth)  are  scant.    As 
predictors, critics‟ ratings capture movie characteristics that appeal to their audience rather than 
influence audience preference.  Reinstein and Snyder (2005) summarize the difference between 
the two roles by defining the influence effect as the causal effect of reviews on demand, and the 
prediction  effect  as  the  spurious  correlation  between  reviews  and  demand,  induced  by  their 5 
 
mutual correlation with quality.  After differencing out the spurious correlation between reviews 
and demand, they find a significant influence effect for the reviewers they study.  Any critical 
bias in reviews is problematic since it distorts the quality signal in this influence role.     
In principle, the only factor that should determine critical reviews is movie quality, e.g., a 
well-written story, compelling acting, or state-of-the-art special effects.  However, other factors 
may  play  a  role  in  determining  movies‟  scores.    Mullainathan  and  Schleifer  (2005)  offer 
theoretical  evidence  showing  that  it  is  optimal for  media  outlets  to  slant  information  in  the 
direction of their audience‟s political biases.  Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) empirically confirm 
this theory by estimating the optimal political slant of different media outlets as a function of the 
political  biases  of  their  respective  audiences.    The  notion  of  optimal  slant  can  logically  be 
extended to critical movie reviews. That is, it may be optimal for profit-maximizing firms to 
provide incentives to employ critics who reflect the tastes of their readers.  For this reason, 
readers‟ tastes may affect critical reviews.   
Inherent critic bias can also play a role in determining critical reviews.  Our focus is on 
the possibility that racial discrimination is a source of bias.  Below, we discuss two possible 
types  of  discrimination:  explicit  discrimination,  which  involves  a  conscious  decision  to 
discriminate,  and  implicit  discrimination,  where  the  decision  to  discriminate  is  at  the  non-
conscious level.   
Arrow  (1998)  highlights  the  differences  between  two  explanations  for  explicit 
discrimination:  taste-based  discrimination  and  statistical  discrimination.  Taste-based 
discrimination can be attributed to a disutility that an evaluator attaches to contact with someone 
from  another  group.    Statistical  discrimination,  on  the  other  hand,  arises  when,  on  average, 
differences exist between race groups in human capital, productivity, risk assessment, etc., but 
the evaluator cannot assess these traits for specific individuals.  In such cases, evaluators use 
average  characteristics  of a race  group  as  a surrogate for unobservable characteristics of an 
individual.    Both  taste-based  and  statistical  discrimination  generate  sustained  differences  in 
market outcomes for individuals from different race groups. 6 
 
The  high  visibility  of  movie  reviews  combined  with  the  general  liberal  bent  of 
newspapers  suggests  that  explicit  discrimination  is  unlikely
4.  Therefore,  we  dedicate  the 
remainder of this section to a discussion of implicit discrimination.   Bertrand et al. (2005) 
propose that an alternative explanation for racial discrimination is implicit discrimination, which 
is  unintentional  and  non-conscious.    Here,  racial  d iscrimination  arises  because  of  natural 
stereotypes held by people about particular race groups.  To show this, the authors measure the 
response time differential in computerized testing where subjects are asked to pair words that 
connote “African American” with words that connote “good” or “bad.”
5     
Research in psychology on mechanisms of non-conscious discrimination includes three 
that are particularly relevant for our setting: expectancy violation, shifting-standards theory and 
status leakage. Expectancy violation theory (Burgoon 1978, Burgoon and Burgoon 2001) sees 
communication, and more broadly human interaction, as an exchange of information.   In an 
evaluation  context,  when  the  evaluator  receives  information  about  the  appraised  target  that 
violates her expectation, or when the evaluator is faced with a target‟s unexpected behavior, the 
evaluator  initiates  cognitive  appraisals  of  this  violation  of  her  expectation.  If  the  target‟s 
behavior is more positive than expected, the evaluation is more favorable than those for behavior 
that matches expectation.  Negative violations result in evaluations less favorable than when 
behavior matches expectation.  In our context this theory would predict that movies with cast 
racial compositions generating a negative (positive) expectancy violation may receive inferior 
(superior) ratings  as  compared to  those without  such a violation, ceteris  paribus.   Historical 
casting patterns in Hollywood have been predominantly Ww or Wb in some cases.   Therefore, 
Bb and Bw movies are most likely to violate expectations of the evaluator.  We further explore in 
section 4.3 the relative ranking of Bb versus Bw movies. 
Shifting-standards theory is described in Foschi (1996) and Biernat and Kobrynowicz 
(1997).  They show that lower performance is expected of low-status groups.  Therefore, there is 
a tendency to downplay even good performance since the ex-ante expectations are low.  For 
                                                 
4 For a contrarian view on possible racism despite being liberal, see Gaertner & Dovidio (1986)‟s theory of aversive 
racism.  They discuss how even whites with liberal values have trouble reconciling these values with their inherent 
racism. For example, in a field experiment, they found that (white) liberals were less likely to help a black (rather 
than a white), stranger in trouble; (white) conservatives were equally unlikely to help whites and blacks. 
5  This study also documents an intriguing feature of implicit attitudes  that can be manipulated: e xposure to 
photographs of admired African Americans like Bill Cosby led to a decrease in  implicit discrimination against 
African Americans. 7 
 
example, in our movie context, performance might be evaluated as “He acted well, considering 
he‟s black”.  However, in absolute rankings, this individual (of a low-status group) might still be 
ranked lower than someone from a higher status group with the same ability.  That is, a low-
status individual is still held to a higher absolute standard than a higher-status individual.  In our 
context, this theory would generally predict lower ratings for casts consisting of blacks (i.e. Bb); 
however, it says little about other aspects of the cast‟s racial composition, in particular the race 
of the lead vs. race of supporting actors.   
The final mechanism we consider for implicit discrimination is status leakage (Podolny, 
2005).  This theory was originally developed for groups of entities e.g. firms in an industry, 
workers in an organization, members of a team, etc. It is especially appropriate for us, given the 
movie quality is being judged by the performance of the entire team of actors (and the entire 
production team‟s efforts), and there might be some impact of the lead actor‟s status on the 
perceived performance of the support cast.  According to this theory, the status of the leader of a 
team can leak over and affect the status of the other members of the team. For example, the 
lower status of the leader of a team can cause lower rankings for the rest of the team as well, 
even if the rest of the team is objectively of higher quality or higher status.  In our application, 
despite equally good performance by lead actors and supporting cast, white support cast in a Ww 
team will be ranker higher than white support cast in a Bw team, because the lower status of the 
leader in Bw leaks over to the white supporting cast.  However, at first blush, it is not obvious 
why a Bb would be judged better than Bw; more on that in section 4.3 below. 
Summarizing, each of the three mechanisms of non-conscious or implicit discrimination 
discussed above might be useful in interpreting our results.   
 
3.  Data 
  In this section we discuss the collection and content of our data on the critics and their 
audience, and then data on movies. 
 
3.1. Data on Critics and Their Newspaper Audience 
We begin this subsection by discussing our data on critics‟ movie ratings.  Individual 
critics‟ reviews for our sample time period are available from www.Metacritic.com (Metacritics).  
We only consider reviews for widely released movies (movies released in more than 600 theaters 8 
 
nationally), because they have measures of actor and director quality that will prove to be useful 
for controlling movie quality (discussed further below).  Metacritics compiles reviews from a 
group of 232 critics referred to as “cream-of-the-crop” given their clout in the industry.  Since 
different  critics  use  different  rating  metrics  (e.g.  4  star,  5-star,  letter  grade,  etc),  Metacritic 
converts each critic‟s review into a score on a zero-to-100 scale.  Alternative compilations of 
individual critic reviews are available from sources like www.rottentomatoes (Rotten Tomatoes) 
www.yahoo.com/movies (Yahoo! Movies).  We choose to use Metacritic ratings because the site 
offers  more  comprehensive  coverage  of  critics‟  reviews  (all  reviews  available  online  are 
compiled  as  opposed  to  just  a  sub-sample  of  available  reviews,  as  is  the  case  with  Yahoo! 
Movies).    Also,  Metacritic  uses  a  more  granular  scale  (Rotten  Tomatoes  uses  a  thumbs-
up/thumbs-down appraisal format and Yahoo! Movies uses a letter grading system).   
We limit our analysis to the set of 68 critics who are employed by one of the 11 daily 
newspapers for which we observe audience characteristics.  For each of these critics, we observe 
experience levels (proxied by a count of their individual reviews compiled on MetaCritic), race, 
and gender (determined using pooled information from MetaCritic, Rotten Tomatoes and the 
popular press).  For five critics in our sample we observe a job transfer to a different newspaper 
market, and for each of these critics we attribute reviews to the market for which they wrote, 
given the date of the job transfer and the date at which the review would have been published
6.  
We provide summary statistics for critics and critic reviews in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
A potential issue with critic ratings is whether there is random assignment of critics to the 
movies they review.  Since all newspapers in our sample employ a team of movie critics, it may 
be a concern that critics who are most racially biased self -select into reviewing movies against 
which they might be prejudiced.  While we were unable to obtain information on how movies are 
assigned to critics within newspapers, we do not believe any sort of (self- or other) selection of 
critics to movies to be reviewed would distort our results.  If any selection is occurring, it would 
                                                 
6 Since newpaper critics‟ reviews are meant to serve as a quality signal prior to consumers having seen the movie, it 
is reasonable to assume that reviews will be published shortly before a movie‟s release, or shortly after release at the 
latest.  In any case, only a few critics transfer from one paper to another.   9 
 
not disprove any findings of racial bias; it would only imply an overstatement of its effect if we 
attempted to make predictions in a world where reviews were randomly assigned.  However, we 
believe  the  proper  context  to  evaluate  our  results  is  under  the  current  system  of  review 
assignment (selected or not) since the counterfactual of truly random assignment is not likely to 
occur. 
As  mentioned  in  Section  2,  critics  might  attempt  to  tailor  their  ratings  towards  the 
preferences of their audience.  To account for this possibility, we gather information on audience 
demographics.  Our demographic profile of newspaper audiences comes from Reader Profile 
reports,  commissioned  by  the  Audit  Bureau  of  Circulations  (ABC).  ABC  audits  newspaper 
circulation  and  maintains  a  database  of  average  reader  demographics  for  most  major  US 
newspapers
7.  These reports are compiled from annual phone surve ys of consumers in each 
newspaper‟s market.  From these reports, we get information for each newspaper‟s readership‟s 
racial composition (percentage of blacks and whites), average age, education (proportion of high-
school  and  college  educated),  income  (proportion  of  households  earning  under  $35,000  and 
above $100,000), and geographic location (East, South, West, Midwest).   
While it is conceivable that not all readers who attest to reading a newspaper necessarily 
read  the  movie  reviews  section,  the  characteristics  of  the  overall  audience  is  likely  to  be 
correlated  with  the  characteristics  of  the  readership  segment  that  does  read  movie  reviews.  
Further, critics may not have precise information (beyond average reader characteristics), about 
which segments of newspaper readers read their reviews.  Hence we consider Reader Profiles to 
be a reasonable measure for the mean demographic characteristics of the average reader of movie 
reviews as perceived by the movie critic. Meta Critic reviews for „cream-of-the-crop‟ critics are 
available  for  11  newspapers  for  which  we  have  Reader  Profiles.    Table  2  summarizes  the 
demographic characteristics of each of these newspapers from 2003 to 2007.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
                                                 
7 Previous literature (e.g., George & Waldfogel 2003) use MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) demographics as a 
proxy for characteristics of the average reader, but we rely on ABC reader profiles instead since the assumption that 
all demographic segments have an equal predisposition to read newspapers may be flawed. 10 
 
3.2. Data on Movie Characteristics 
Our data on movie characteristics come from several sources.  Yahoo! Movies has a 
synopsis page for each movie that also lists the names of the five main actors (i.e., the actors who 
played the most consequential parts of the movie) in the order of their role‟s importance for the 
movie plot. Specifically, the name of the lead actor is listed first followed by the names of 
supporting  actors,  from  the  most  significant  role  played  to  the  least.  While  this  order  is 
sometimes lead actor, romantic interest, side-kick, villain etc., it can also be lead actor, co-lead, 
side-kick etc. For example, the movie My Baby‟s Daddy (2004) is about two black and one 
white friends growing up together, and all three have pregnant girlfriends. In this movie, the first 
two characters listed in Yahoo! are the two black friends, with their white friend listed at number 
three. Therefore, the order reflects more the significance of roles rather than the type of role 
(main character, romantic interest, etc.) 
We rely on cast information from Yahoo! Movies because it uses a harmonized system to 
define top-five roles across movies.  Other movie sites, like imdb.com, only list actors in the two 
main roles and the rest of the cast (including all cameo appearances) in alphabetical order.  This 
does not allow us to easily infer the identities and corresponding race groups of the main cast 
members.   
For our sample, we track the top-five cast members (as listed in Yahoo! Movies) for 566 
wide-release movies  screened in  theaters from  2003 to  2007. For each of these movies, we 
investigate  which  of  the  top-five  cast  members  is  black;  we  follow  a  similar  procedure  to 
determine  the  race  of  the  director.  To  do  this,  we  start  with  a  list  of  black  actors  from 
Wikipedia.org.  While Wiki may not always be reliable as a general source of information, we 
believe it to be for our purposes.  This is because Hollywood stars tend to be popular, and 
information about them is readily available and can be readily verified and altered if incorrect.  
Also, given the open access format of Wikipedia, it is reasonable to assume that any wrong 
information about figures as popular as Hollywood stars would be quickly corrected or disputed 
by fans, actor‟s managers, etc.  Then, in the next step, we searched for on-line photographs to 
verify  the  race  of  actors;  the  information  came  from  various  sources  including  actors‟  own 
webpages, fan pages, African-American magazines, etc.  For the purposes of this study, we 11 
 
classify  all  other  race-groups  as  white  since  the  number  of  actors  in  other  minority  groups 
(Asian, Hispanic, Arab, etc.) is much lower.
8 As such, if the industry discriminates against other 
non-white  race  groups  as  well,  our  results  will  likely  underestimate  the  total  extent  of 
discrimination. 
Given our race definitions, we observe 64 (of 566) movies which cast blacks in lead roles 
(either Bb or Bw).  Further, 182 movies had at least one  black cast member (Bb, Bw, or Wb), 
and 384 movies had an all-white (Ww) top-5 cast. Table 3a shows the racial breakdown of each 
of the top five cast members given their respective positions in the cast.  
 
[Table 3a about here] 
 
To control for quality differences in actors and directors,  we obtain a count of BFCA 
(Broadcast Film Critics Association) awards and nominations that each actor  and director had 
received for all movies prior to focal movie
9.  We supplemented these measures by obtaining 
actors‟ “bankability” scores, which are designed to measure the commercial viability of each 
movie  star.  These  measures  were  computed  by  The  Hollywood  Reporter  in  2002  and  are 
therefore invariant to the commercial success of movies in our sample period.  Consequently, 
they may not capture the evolution of star-bankability from 2002 to 2007 (the end of our sample 
period).  Therefore, these measures are proxies for the actual bankability of the actors at the time 
they were observed
10.     
Table 3b shows the average bankability scores of cast members for all movies in our 
sample by race and by position in the cast.  We observe that bankability scores for lead actors are 
on average higher for all movies and trend down between the lead and the fourth supporting role.  
Average bankability of black actors in the lead position is on average higher  than that of their 
white counterparts.  In supporting positions, black actors have higher average bankability for the 
two most important supporting roles. 
                                                 
8 Jewish actors collectively constitute an exception; we leave an evaluation of critics‟ treatment of this and other 
categories (like gender) for further study. 
9 We considered other awards counts as well (e.g., Oscars).  However, for reasons discussed below, we use movie 
BFCA awards and nominations as another control, so for consistency, we use these measures here as well.  
10 We believe these are proper proxies since they are almost certainly correlated with bankability of the actors at the 
time of the observation (e.g., if an actor had a high bankability in 2002, it appears likely it was high in 2005 also ), 
and they should be uncorrelated with critic reviews conditional on bankability at the time of the observation.   12 
 
 
[Table 3b about here] 
 
We  include  several  other  measures  of  movie  quality.    First,  we  include  production 
budget.  We  also  include  advertising  expenditure  (called  “print  and  advertising”  in  industry 
parlance); this might capture expected quality of the movie and might also influence critics‟ 
ratings if a movie is expected to be a commercial success.  These data are obtained from Paul 
Kagan and Associates.  We also include MPAA rating (i.e. whether a movie is rated G, PG-13, 
R, etc.), as well as movie genre and production studio dummies, to control for any systematic 
differences in quality along these dimensions. For example, it is possible that G-rated movies 
have lower artistic quality given their primary audience is children, or that critics systematically 
prefer the Drama genre to the Horror genre.  Similarly, some studios might have higher quality 
than others.  Our genre controls include: Animation, Action and Adventure, Comedy, Drama, 
Horror  and  Thriller,  Romance  and  Science  Fiction.    These  data  are  from 
www.boxofficemojo.com (BoxOfficeMojo).   
The above controls are important, especially if they correlate with the racial composition 
of the casts.  For example, lower budgets could be a consequence of black leads being paid less 
on average (which should imply a higher quality of acting, conditional on any level of budget).  
Similarly, lower advertising expenditures could be a consequence of more targeted marketing of 
movies with black leads to the black community (e.g. in Ebony magazine).  It is possible that if 
movies with black cast members are not as well-promoted, critics do not form a positive opinion 
of such movies as a result.   
Our final measure of quality is the movie‟s artistic appeal. Holbrook (2005) argues that 
movies are either commercial successes or artistically high quality, with viewers preferring the 
former (and hence they are commercial successes), and critics preferring the latter.  To capture 
the artistic quality of a movie, we use a summary statistic comprised of total BFCA nominations 
and wins (with nominations weighted by 0.5) for a movie across all categories (movie overall, 
acting, directing, writing, music, etc.). We also considered alternative measures of artistic appeal 
including Academy Awards (Oscars) and Golden  Globe Awards.  The Academy awards are 
awarded by a community of  experts and non-experts. The Golden Globes are awarded by a 
community of foreign critics who may not appraise movie quality in the same way critics in our 13 
 
sample do, especially because they are writing for a different audience.  In contrast, the BFCAs 
are voted upon by a large community of U.S. based critics who are members of the Broadcast 
Film Critics Association, and who cast independent and anonymous ballots for the movies of 
their choice.  In voting for the BFCAs, critics are not  constrained by the profit-maximizing 
objectives of the newspapers which publish their reviews. Therefore, these awards are likely to 
be  reflective  of  quality
11. Of the  566  movies in our sample,  97  won at least one BFCA 
nomination. Of these 97 movies, 70 featured an all-white top-five cast and 7 starred a black actor 
in the lead position (these latter movies were nominated but did not win). 
In Table 4 below, we present summary statistics for all our movie-level measures.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  Finally, to measure the impact of critic ratings  movie revenues, we use  box office 
revenue  data  collected  from  two  internet  sites:  www.Boxofficemojo.com  (BM)  and 
www.imdb.com (IMDB), for years 2003-2007.  A quick glance at this variable shows that the 
average total box office revenue for the movies in our sample was $64.2 million, with significant 
variance despite all these movies being wide-release only.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Critic Reviews 
In this subsection, we present the results of our regressions of critic ratings on cast racial 
composition, which include various critic-, movie-, and newspaper-level (including newspaper 
fixed effects) controls discussed in section 3.  Additionally, it is possible that average review 
scores may change over time, with seasons, or due to extraneous events.   Therefore, we also 
include fixed effects for every month in our sample.   
We specify the following equation for critics‟ ratings: 
 
                                                 
11 We note here that, it is possible that our award measure is negatively correlated with cast racial composition.  In 
fact, we do find a negative correlation in our data.  However, this does not induce any bias in our results (since both 
are used as covariates) or pose a collinearity problem (since the correlation is not large, -0.07).  14 
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Here, Rijkt is the individual review of critic i for movie j in newspaper market k in time period t.  
BlkLeadj  is a dummy variable which equals one if the lead actor is black.  MovieCharj is a vector 
of  movie  j’s  characteristics,  including  genre,  MPAA  rating,  quality  measures  for  actors  and 
directors, director race, and movie awards (nominations and wins).  NPDemogkt is a vector of 
demographics  for  newspaper  market  k  in  time  period  t,  including  newspaper  fixed  effects.  
CritChari is a vector of critic characteristics for critic i including race, gender and experience.  
Montht represents fixed effects corresponding to the timing of the critic‟s review.  Finally εijkt is 
an idiosyncratic error term.   
Our regression results are in Table 5 below, which contains the primary findings of this 
paper.  In column 1, we regressed critic ratings only on BlkLeadj.  Here we see that movies with 
black leads receive scores that are nearly four points lower than those without black leads; this 
represents about a 6% difference given the average rating is approximately 58 (on the 0-100 
scale used by Metacritic).  The race of the director does not influence critic ratings. Taken by 
itself, this result is suggestive of a racial bias against black lead actors.  However, as noted in 
section 3, there are many movie characteristics that could be correlated both with critic ratings 
and cast racial composition.  Column 2 presents the results when we regress  ratings on the 
dummy for black lead along with our full set of controls following equation (1) above.  Here we 
see the effect is notably smaller (less than half the size), and insignificant.   
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 suggest that critics may exhibit a small bias 
against black leads (once we include the controls
12).  However, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
it seems unlikely that such an overt practice of discrimination could be occurring among movie 
critics.  In column 3, we allow for a finer partitioning of movies along racial lines.  Specifically, 
                                                 
12 These results are robust to inclusion of interaction terms between % of newspaper audience that is black and the 
dummy for the lead being black. 15 
 
we consider four groupings: Bw (black lead with all-white support), Bb (black lead with at least 
one black support), Ww (white lead with all-white support), and Ww (white lead with at least 
one black support).  This grouping allows us to determine whether lower scores for movies with 
black leads depend upon the racial composition of the supporting cast.   This new specification is 
as follows: 
 
(2)  ????? =
𝗼0 + 𝗼1?????𝑎?? + 𝗼2???????? + 𝗼3?????𝑎? ∗ ???????? + 𝗼4??????ℎ𝑎𝑟 ? +
𝗼5??????𝑔?? + 𝗼6?𝑟???ℎ𝑎𝑟? + 𝗼7????ℎ? + 𝜀????  
 
Here, BlkSuppj is a dummy equal to one if one of the supporting (1-4) actors is black.  The third 
term is an interaction term allowing for different effects of having a black lead depending on the 
racial composition of the supporting cast. 
The results of this regression (reported in column 3 of table 5) are striking.  In particular, 
we find that Bw movies receive significantly lower scores than movies of any other composition 
(α1 = -3.40).  Using a Ww cast as our base group, we find that Bw movies are scored 3.40 points 
lower (about a 6% effect).  In contrast, Bb movies are scored just 0.49 (= -3.40 – 0.75 + 3.66) 
points  lower,  and  Wb  movies  are  scored  just  0.75  points  lower  –  neither  being  statistically 
significant
13.  The race of the director continues to not influence critics‟ ratings. 
In column 4 of Table 5, we rerun our results instrumenting for advertising expenditure.  
Of all of our controls, advertising seems the most likely to be endogenous since this is adjustable 
in the short-run and could depend on unobserved quality (at least as perceived by the producers).  
In fact, this is the only control variable we use that can be adjusted in response to a movie‟s 
perceived quality after production is finished.  As an instrument for advertising, for each given 
movie, we construct a variable that is the average advertising expenditure on all other movies by 
the given movie‟s studio during that movie‟s run in movie theaters.  Studios generally do not 
engage  in  cross  promotions  for  their  movies,  so  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  advertising 
                                                 
13 These results are robust to interactions between cast racial composition and reviewer race.  We do not report these 
results because the estimates of the interaction parameters are extremely noisy due to the small number of black 
reviewers (6% of reviews in our sample, see table 1). 16 
 
expenditures on other movies by the studio should not affect a given movie‟s rating. We expect 
our instrument to be positively correlated with advertising since all movies in a given season are 
likely to see similar demand shocks (e.g., peak demand such as during the Holidays or off-peak 
such  as  February).    Further,  changes  in  studio  advertising  budgets  may  depend  on  recent 
previous successes (or failures) by the studio; if the budget increases, then expenditures on all 
movies released near that time should rise, after controlling for quality differences between them. 
Our first stage results strongly confirm this intuition (the coefficient on studio advertising for 
other concurrent movies is positive with a t-stat over 6).  The results in column 4 show that our 
coefficient on advertising does change; however, our primary results for our race variables are 
virtually identical. 
In columns 5 and 6, we consider alternative ways to measure “leader” vs. “follower” 
roles to evaluate the robustness of our results.  As mentioned previously, movies can have two 
co-leads, or two actors with about the same level of importance to plot, e.g. the two black friends 
in My Baby‟s Daddy (2004) mentioned in section 3.  Consequently, in column 5, we let our 
“black lead” dummy capture whether the actor listed as the lead or as #2 is black, and then 
define the support as actors in #3-#5 positions.  In column 6, we take a similar approach, except 
here the “black lead” dummy captures whether the actor listed as the lead and as #2 are both 
black.  The results for both of these regressions corroborate our main findings.  In column 5, we 
see very similar estimates to our primary regression in column 4.  Further, in column 6, we see 
an  even  stronger,  qualitatively  identical  effect.    We  also  reran  the  equation  in  column  (4) 
redefining BlackSuppj to equal one only if one of the first three supporting cast members is black 
(as opposed to four).  Here again we found very similar results to those in column (4). This gives 
us confidence that our results are not driven by quirks in movie themes/plots (e.g. movies with 
leads/co-leads versus those with lead/romantic interest) or in Yahoo!‟s definitions of lead versus 
support #2. 
 
4.2. Impact of Critics’ Ratings on Movie Sales 
Having established that critic ratings appear to depend on cast racial compositions, we 
attempt to calculate a rough estimate of the revenue impact from lower ratings for Bw movies.  




ln(???????) = 𝗾0 + 𝗾1?𝑟?????𝑎???𝑔? + 𝗾2??????ℎ𝑎𝑟 ? + 𝗾3?????ℎ?𝑎?? + 𝗾4????ℎ? + 𝜉?? 
 
Here,  CriticRatingj  is  the  average  critic  rating  for  movie  j,  MovieCharj  contains  all 
information as in (2) above (including racial composition of cast and director), OpenTheatj is the 
number of theatres in which the movie opened, Monthj is a dummy for the month during which 
the movie opened, and ξj is an idiosyncratic error term. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
We present the results of this regression in Table 6.  Column 1 contains OLS estimates, 
and in column 2 we again instrument for advertising expenditures as we did in section 4.1
14.  For 
both regressions, we find a similarly positive and significant estimate for average critic rating.  
Our estimates for the impact of cast racial composition  are all statistically insignificant.  These 
results suggest that the cast racial composit ion of movies  does not directly  affect revenues, at 
least in the aggregate.  In the absence of individual viewing data, we are unable to assess further 
why this is the case.  We conjecture three possibilities: (1) viewers are not influenced by rac ial 
composition of the cast. So our sample of critics is not representative of the population at large; 
(2) only a segment of the population is influenced by cast racial composition, and this segment is 
counterbalanced by others that are not, or are  influenced by racial composition of the  cast in 
opposite ways. (3) cast racial composition  does influence quality assessment by viewers, but 
quality assessment  only occurs after seeing the movie and so cannot directly influence the 
purchase decision (they must rely on critic reviews and word of mouth from those who have seen 
the movie to determine quality ex ante)
15. 
                                                 
14 The IV results suggest that the coefficient on advertising is negatively biased in our OLS revenue regressions (in 
column 1), as opposed to the apparent positive bias in our OLS ratings regressions in columns 1-3 of Table 5.  This 
may be due to studios choosing to advertise more for higher quality movies that are initially underperforming at the 
box office. 
15 Consequently, in future research, it would be especially informative to gather individual viewers‟ assessments of 
movie quality after seeing the film.  18 
 
While these results indicate race does not affect revenues directly, they do indicate that it 
affects revenues via its impact on critic ratings. Using our estimate for average critic ratings from 
this (IV) regression and our estimate for the rating penalty for Bw movies (column 4 of Table 5), 
we find that biased ratings can translate into approximately a 4% loss (3.4 * 1.3%) in total box 
office revenues. The average revenue for movies in our sample is $64.2 million, and therefore 
the 4% loss in box office is about $2.57 million.  
Following arguments in Reinstein & Snyder (2005), we recognize that our estimates for 
the impact of critic ratings on revenues is rough.  Specifically, we are not instrumenting for the 
critic review variable, and so these estimates likely confound critics‟ influencer role with their 
predictor role, despite the fact that we include a substantially larger number of controls.  For this 
reason, these estimates likely yield an upper bound for the influencer effect of critic reviews.  
Given that Reinstein & Snyder (2005) find that critics do influence consumer demand for a 
movie (the influencer role), we conclude that the box office revenue cost of the critic bias we 
find is strictly bounded away from zero on the left and 4% on the right (i.e., 0 < revenue effect < 
4%).   However, an increasingly large fraction of studio profits are made in secondary channels 
(DVD sales and rentals, pay-per-view, television syndication, etc.), and these sales are highly 
correlated  with  theatrical  sales.    Therefore,  the  total  revenue  effect  of  racially  biased  critic 
reviews (including all secondary channels) could be even larger. 
     
4.3. Discussion 
The nature of our results (lower reviews for black lead, white support movies) along with 
the common view that newspapers are generally left-leaning and the high visibility of reviews, 
lead us to believe that explicit discrimination (taste-based or statistical) is unlikely in this case.  
In particular, had movies with black leads per se (both Bb and Bw) or movies with a significant 
number of black actors (Bb) received lower scores, these lower scores could have been indicative 
of a systematic distaste for black actors or some form of statistical discrimination.   It seems 
unlikely that professional critics consciously decide they like a movie less because it has a Bw 
configuration (due to distaste for such a lineup or statistical belief that this lineup will produce 
lower  quality.  Note  that  the  statistical  discrimination  argument  is  weak  to  begin  with  given 
critics view the movie, observe its quality and then write a review).  Consequently, we revisit the 
two  relevant  mechanisms  of  non-conscious  discrimination  from  literature  in  psychology 19 
 
discussed  earlier  (expectancy  violation,  and  shifting-standards  theory)  and  their  predictions 
concerning our results in turn.     
We begin with expectancy violation.  The result of higher critic rankings for Bb movies 
compared to Bw movies) suggests that there is a negative expectancy violation in seeing blacks 
in lead roles when all of the “followers” are white.  This is not surprising given blacks have 
traditionally starred in supporting roles in movies, and there is a disproportionately lower number 
of blacks in several “lead roles” in society, relative to their percentage of the population.   
As an exploratory exercise, we analyzed whether lead roles in Bw movies were cross-
over roles, i.e. roles that are not specific to blacks.  A cross-over role played by a black actor is 
likely to cause more expectancy violation for the critic than a role specifically designed to be 
played by a black.  To measure whether roles are cross-over, we used two methods.  First, using 
Bureau of Labor Statistics‟ data on black employment in various professions, we measured if 
blacks were over-represented or under-represented in any profession relative to their percentage 
in the working population of the U.S.  For example, the movie “Catwoman” (2004) is about a 
shy black graphic designer who works for a cosmetics company, and transforms into a woman 
with magical powers
16. The percentage of blacks  in “Arts and related fields” is 2.6% of total 
employed, and in “Design” is 4.0%, compared to  blacks comprising 11% of total employed 
population. Therefore, this role could easily have been played by a white actress; in fact, having 
a white actress in the role would be more representative of racial employment patterns. However, 
not all roles can be classified using national statistics on industry employment by race.  In some 
cases, we have to use plot details to classify whether the lead role is black-specific or cross-over.  
Consider the movie “Barbershop 2: Back in Business” (2004) set in a black barbershop in South 
Chicago. This movie can be expected to have a black lead with some (black and some) white 
supporting cast.  Therefore, we classify the lead role as being black-specific because the movie 
plot demands that it be so. The movie Freedomland (2006) is about a white woman who claims a 
black man kidnapped her son, and the case is investigated by a black detective.  While blacks 
might be under-represented in higher ranks in the police force, the story line calls for a black 
                                                 
16 Incidentally, Halle Berry, the actress who played the lead role, received the Golden Raspberry or Razzie award for 
the Worst Actress for playing this role.  This award was instituted to (dis)honor the worst performances in movies in 
any year.  She had previously won the Oscar for Best Actress in 2001. Halle Berry‟s father is African-American and 
mother Caucasian. 20 
 
police  lead  detective.  Therefore,  we  classify  this  lead  role  as  also  being  black-specific.  
Following this classification scheme, we find that 82% of critics‟ ratings of black-lead movies in 
our data are for cross-over lead roles.  Interestingly, we find the less black-specific the lead role, 
the lower the critics‟ rating (correlation = 0.29).  That is, critics rate higher movies where lead 
roles are meant to be played by blacks, but rank lower movies where blacks are cast in roles that 
should, statistically speaking, be played by whites   
As mentioned in section 2, shifting-standards theory predicts the following:  while black 
actors might more easily receive a passing grade when cast in lead roles, because of the prior 
lower expectations of them, black actors will still be held to a higher absolute standard than 
(higher-status) white actors.  Therefore, we would have expected Bb movies to be lowest ranked, 
if shifting standards are applied to each team member, and Bw to be ranked higher.   
Consider now the status leakage theory (Podolny, 2005).  As mentioned in section 2, the 
lower status of the leader of a team can cause lower rankings for the rest of the team as well, 
even if the rest of the team is objectively of higher quality or higher status. Therefore, Ww will 
be  ranked  above  Bw,  because  of  the  contamination  of  status  of  whites  in  a  Bw  movie.  To 
understand why Bb is ranked above Bw, it would have to be the case that the contaminated 
higher status of white support in Bw results in lower status than the (to begin with) low status of 
black support in Bb. Consider the work of Cabrera et al. (2008).  They find that performance 
expectations for a team were more favorable when the leader‟s gender was congruent with the 
industry‟s gender-typing. For example, if a team works for a male investment banker, people 
might judge them to be better at their jobs than if the team worked for a female banker. .In our 
industry, if black lead roles are cross-over roles and not black-specific, critics might evaluate the 
whole cast and movie as lower.  Seeing a black lead in a movie with black support is less likely 
to violate expectations for the race of the leader (“There are several black actors in the movie, 
it‟s not unusual that they have a black leader”), and therefore status leakage is not triggered. This 
then could be another mechanism (in addition to expectancy violation theory) through which Bb 
movies are rated more highly than Bw movies.  
Summarizing,  literature  in  psychology  suggests  the  mechanism  for  implicit 
discrimination in our context might be as follows: seeing black leads with white supporting cast 
members violates both the expectation of who critics expect to be starring in non-race specific 21 
 
roles and presents a situation where the lower status of the lead in (the unexpected) lead role 
leaks to the white supporting cast. 
We conclude this section by discussing a couple possible caveats for our findings.  While 
we have attributed our empirical findings to implicit discrimination on the part of critics, it is 
possible that our results could be driven by discrimination and/or selection at the production 
level.  Specifically, it is possible that black leads get roles after these roles have been turned 
down by white leads (with greater market power), perhaps because of weaker scripts and other 
quality dimensions not captured by our measures of quality. However, this phenomenon is likely 
true of non-lead roles as well; that is, for any cross-over support role, a black actor might get cast 
after a white one turns down the role.  By this logic, there is no reason why a Bb movie should 
be ranked higher than a Bw movie. Also, if this explanation were true, we would expect to see a 
sales penalty for (the lower quality) Bw movies in the box office; results from regression (4) do 
not support this.  Another explanation for our results is the longer history of discrimination in 
casting in Hollywood, mentioned in the introduction. Therefore, it is possible that  producers or 
casting directors  are less  willing to  cast  black leads  in movies  they believe to  be of higher 
quality, i.e. that only the lower quality movies are available to blacks.  Once again, if this were 
true, then the lowest quality movies should be cast Bb; this is inconsistent with our result of Bb 
having greater critical ranking than Bw.  Additionally, we do not observe a sales penalty for a 
Bw movie; this fact is inconsistent with a Bw movie being lower quality.  . 
 
5.--Conclusion 
Despite accounting for a large number of controls, we find that critics‟ movie ratings 
have a systematic relationship with cast racial compositions.  Specifically, movies with black 
leads and all-white supporting casts (Bw) appear to suffer about a 6% penalty in their ratings 
compared to movies with other cast racial compositions (Bb, Ww and Wb).  This finding is 
robust to alternative measures of “lead” vs. “support” roles, and even appears stronger when 
“black lead” is defined as the top two cast members being black.  Aside from the potential social 
welfare  costs  resulting  from  this  bias,  we  find  that  this  critic  ratings  penalty  can  result  in 
theatrical box office revenue costs of up to 4% for the average film. 22 
 
Given our findings and the industry we study, our results seem most consistent with 
implicit (or non-conscious, in psychology terms) discrimination, as opposed to taste-based or 
statistical discrimination (both of which are conscious decisions).  The two possible mechanisms 
for this  implicit discrimination  are  expectancy  violation theory  and/or  status  leakage theory.  
According to these theories, seeing black leads with white supporting cast members violates the 
expectation of who critics expect to be starring in non-race specific roles, and presents a situation 
where the lower status of the lead leaks to the white supporting cast, respectively.  In either case, 
the result would be a lower overall evaluation of the film.   
There are several ways in which this study could be extended.  A logical extension would 
be to investigate critical bias in favor or against other minority groups including female leads.  It 
might also be instructive to see how black newspapers rate movies, given they are writing for a 
different  audience than  black critics  in  our sample  who are  writing for general  newspapers.  
Various experiments have found that blacks are subject to negative stereotypes about themselves 
(see Clark and Clark 1940 for the original study of black children preferring white dolls to black 
dolls; see Edney 2006 for similar and more recent results).  Unfortunately, we were unable to 
find any viable data on critics‟ reviews from these newspapers.  Alternatively, if sufficient data 
could be found, it might be instructive to study how the critics in our sample rate foreign films 
with mixed race  cast compositions (e.g. Brazilian movies with mixed races, or  Japanese movies 
with a white actor in it) to understand if racism varies with plot context.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Critics and Reviews (N= 4339) 
17 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Rating  58.14  21.45 
Gender (Female = 1)  0.26  0.44 
Race (Black = 1)  0.06  0.24 
Number of Reviews  1062.8  682.3 
 
 
Table 2: Audience Demographics for the 11 Major Newspapers for Which Critics in the 
Data Review 


































Globe  88.7  5.8  9.7  32.7  44.0  16.3  29.8  East 
Charlotte 
Observer  79.7  17.5  9.4  33.7  30.0  21.8  18.2  South 
Chicago Sun 
Times  64.7  31.3  13.0  31.6  21.5  21.8  22.0  Midwest 
Chicago 
Tribune  82.2  12.6  9.2  35.9  40.0  14.2  31.6  Midwest 
Los Angeles 
Times  78.9  9.3  10.3  33.4  36.4  17.6  28.7  West 
Miami 
Herald  75.4  20.8  9.9  34.2  29.3  23.8  21.6  South 
New York 
Times  84.1  9.7  12.0  34.4  57.2  13.1  38.7  East 
Philadelphia 
Inquirer  77.5  18.2  8.2  38.2  33.3  19.9  24.3  East 
San 
Francisco 




18  87.2  3.5  8.3  33.3  37.5  17.5  21.2  West 
Washington 
Post  65.4  28.0  9.1  30.5  46.3  10.3  40.8  East 
                                                 
17 Note that our summary statistic for rating is at the critic/movie level since each critic reviews many movies.  The 
other two summary statistics are for variables that vary at the critic level. 
18 This newspaper has since shut down its print edition, and is only available online. 26 
 
Table 3a: Number of movies by race of cast member and position in cast 
  Lead  Supporting 1  Supporting 2  Supporting 3  Supporting 4 
Black Actor  64  57  49  59  46 
White Actor  502  509  517  507  520 




Table 3b: Average bankability by race of cast member and position in cast 
 
Lead  Supporting 1  Supporting 2  Supporting 3  Supporting 4 
Black Actor  46.4  26.8  24.0  11.8  8.0 
White Actor  39.3  23.2  16.1  11.2  8.8 
All Actors  40.1  23.6  16.8  11.2  8.7 
   27 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Movie Characteristics (N = 566) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Lead is Black  0.11  0.32 
At Least One Black Support  0.28  0.45 
Budget ($ Mil.)  51.0  43.0 
Advertising ($ Mil.)  30.0  9.8 
Director is Black  0.04  0.21 
BFCA Nom. + Awards of Lead  0.61  1.03 
BFCA Nom. + Awards of #2  0.34  0.75 
BFCA Nom. + Awards of #3  0.21  0.61 
BFCA Nom. + Awards of #4  0.11  0.40 
BFCA Nom. + Awards of #5  0.10  0.41 
Bankability of Lead  40.1  33.6 
Bankability of #2  23.6  25.9 
Bankability of #3  16.8  21.3 
Bankability of #4  11.2  17.8 
Bankability of #5  8.7  16.2 
BFCA Nominations * (0.5) + Awards  0.25  0.80 
Buena Vista  0.09  0.29 
Dream Works  0.05  0.23 
Fox  0.13  0.33 
MGM  0.05  0.21 
Miramax  0.03  0.17 
New Line  0.07  0.25 
Paramount  0.09  0.29 
Sony  0.09  0.29 
Universal  0.10  0.30 
Warner Brothers  0.11  0.32 
Animated  0.08  0.28 
Action and Adventure  0.22  0.42 
Comedy  0.27  0.44 
Horror  0.17  0.38 
Romantic Comedy  0.08  0.27 
Sci-Fi  0.04  0.20 
Drama  0.13  0.34 
G Rated  0.03  0.18 
PG Rated  0.19  0.39 
PG13 Rated  0.46  0.50 
R Rated  0.32  0.47 
Total Box Office Revenue ($ Mil.)  64.2  67.5 
 
   Table 5: OLS and IV Regressions for Critic Reviews on Racial Composition of Cast and Controls (N = 4339) 
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Covariate 









Lead: #1 or #2 
Supp: #3-#5 
Lead: #1 & #2 
Supp: #3-#5 
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Awards + Noms  










Awards + Noms  










Awards + Noms  










R-Square  0.003  0.260  0.261  0.265  0.266  0.265 
                                                 
19 Additional controls in all but regression (1) i.e. in regressions (2)-(6) include: month/year fixed effects; bankability of actors #1-#5; gender, experience, and 
race of reviewer; studio fixed effects; genre fixed effects; movie rating (e.g., R, PG, PG-13); newspaper fixed effects; region fixed effects; and proportion of 
newspaper audience that is: over 55, under 25, college educated, black, has income < $25K, has income > $100K.  Standard errors are in parentheses and were 
clustered by critic. ** is significant at 1% level, and * is significant at 5% level. 
20 P-value is 0.059. Table 6: OLS and IV Regressions for Log of Total Revenue on Average Critic Rating and 
Controls (N = 566) 
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Covariate  (1) OLS  (2) IV 




























R-Square  0.767  0.682 
 
                                                 
21  Additional  controls  include  month/year  fixed  effects,  awards  and  nominations  of  actors  #1-#5  and  director, 
bankability of actors #1-#5, cast racial composition, director race, number of opening theatres, studio fixed effects, 
genre  fixed  effects,  and  movie  rating  (e.g.,  R,  PG,  PG  13).    Robust  standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  **  is 
significant at 1% level, and * is significant at 5% level. 